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Executive Summary 
 With ageing populations and rising rates of chronic diseases, medical devices are increasingly 
vital components of health care. From tongue depressors and stethoscopes to pacemakers and 
medical robotics, medical devices are numerous, diverse and constantly evolving, integrating 
medicine, biomechanics, materials, software, and electronics in their development and 
application (Chen et al., 2018). However, while innovation is generally beneficial for patients, the 
complexity and diversity of medical devices poses a challenge for regulatory systems across the 
globe, which are often slow to adapt to the increasing complexity of medical devices, 
unpredictable risks, and emerging threats to public health (Curfman and Redberg, 2011; Mishra, 
2017; Chen et al., 2018). Consequently, with medical device failures and malfunctions appearing 
in media and academic journals there is a global push for stricter regulatory reform and 
harmonization of regulatory frameworks internationally (Curfman and Redberg, 2011; 
Altenstetter, 2012; Maak & Wylie, 2016; Chen et al., 2018). This capstone will review and 
compare the regulatory frameworks for three jurisdictions (Canada, the United States and the 
European Union) with an aim of identifying post-market strategies which could be applicable to 
the Canadian context. Additionally the current and proposed changes to the Canadian medical 
device regulations will be discussed and analysed across multiple dimensions (burdens on various 
actors, innovation vs regulatory oversight and health risk protection) and, the 3-I framework will 
be used to deepen the understanding behind the shift in regulatory approach that Health Canada 
is working to implement. Lastly, based on the regulatory approaches compared and analysed it 
will provide an informed opinion on the approach that Health Canada is taking. 
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Introduction 
 With ageing populations and rising rates of chronic diseases, medical devices are increasingly 
vital components of health care. From tongue depressors and stethoscopes to pacemakers and 
medical robotics, medical devices are numerous, diverse and constantly evolving, integrating 
medicine, biomechanics, materials engineering, software and electronics in their development 
and application (Chen et al., 2018). These characteristics are essential, particularly for 
implantable and invasive devices (like artificial joints, pacemakers and defibrillators), to meet the 
changing and dynamic needs of patients (Curfman and Redberg, 2011). However, while 
innovation is generally beneficial for patients, the complexity and diversity of medical devices 
poses a challenge for regulatory systems across the globe which are relatively new and slow to 
adapt to the increasing complexity of medical devices, unpredictable risks, and emerging threats 
to public health (Curfman and Redberg, 2011; Mishra, 2017; Chen et al., 2018). Consequently, 
with medical device malfunctions appearing in media and academic journals there is increasing 
momentum for stricter regulatory reform and harmonization of regulatory frameworks across 
jurisdictions to promote the use of medical device across jurisdictions and align regulatory 
frameworks with each other (Curfman and Redberg, 2011; Altenstetter, 2012; Maak & Wylie, 
2016; Chen et al., 2018).  
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Purpose 
In Canada, medical device regulation has become a priority for the Health Minister and 
policy advisors at Health Canada after mounting reports of injuries and devices being pulled off 
the market in other jurisdictions (Government of Canada, 2018). This offers an opportunity to 
consider the current regulations and analyse the proposed future state of the Canadian medical 
device regulatory framework. Thus, the purpose of this capstone is to compare and critically 
review regulatory approaches form comparable regulatory frameworks and provide an informed 
opinion of the approach that Health Canada is taking. Specifically, this capstone will:   
1. review the development of medical device regulatory frameworks in Canada, the 
United States and the European Union,  
2. compare medical device regulatory frameworks across the three jurisdictions,  
3. review and compare the current and proposed changes that the Canadian 
Government is making to their regulations, 
4. analyse the proposed changes to the Canadian regulations on their burden on 
industry, the health care system and patients, promotion of innovation, health risk 
protection and regulatory oversight, and 
5. apply the 3-I framework to deepen our understanding the movement underlying the 
future state of the Canadian Medical Device Regulations. 
Information on the regulations of the different jurisdictions discussed in this capstone were found 
online on the respective government websites, regulations, and guidance documents. Internet 
searches were conducted on each jurisdiction for further information on supporting guidelines 
and policy interpretation. Grey literature was initially used to identify relevant articles and narrow 
down the focus of this capstone. 
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Background 
 
Historical Context of Medical Device Regulations in the US, EU & Canada 
Medical device regulations are a relatively recent development (Mishra, 2017), but build on 
a longer history of regulation of pharmaceutical products. In the US, the evolution of the current 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act begun with the Pure Food and Drug Act in 1906 which was created 
to restrain tainted food and drugs (Figure 1) (Van Norman, 2016). The Food and Drugs Act 
replaced the Pure Food and Drug Act in 1938 to ensure the safety of approved drugs (Van 
Norman, 2016). Responding to the thalidomide tragedy of the 1960s, regulatory agencies 
(including Canada, United States and European Union) had to improve the level of oversight and 
robustness of their regulations (Mishra, 2017). The US Food and Drugs Act was amended in 1962 
to include proof of effectiveness, and then expanded to include the regulation of medical devices 
in 1976 and amended with the Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act in 2002 (Van 
Norman, 2016; Van Norman, 2016). The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 established the 
classification system which includes three risk-based classes (based on the extent of regulatory 
oversight needed  for safe and effective devices) ranging from class I (lowest risk) to class III 
(highest risk) which is still in place today (FDA, 2019).  
Figure 1. Historical highlights of the US medical device regulatory framework. 
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In Europe, standardization of drug regulations preceded the formation of the EU with EC 
Directive 65/65/EEC in 1965 (Figure 2) (Van Norman, 2016). This is in contrast to medical devices 
where regulation was in in the hands of the Member States until the mid-1990s, leading to 
barriers for distribution. The introduction of three Directives (Active Implantable Medical Device 
Directive, Medical Device Directive, and In Vitro Diagnostic Medical Device Directive) in the 1990s 
established the Medical Device Directive and initiated the regulation of safety and marketing of 
medical devices (French-Mowat & Burnett, 2012; Van Norman, 2016; Mishra, 2017). In 2017, 
major updates to the EU medical device regulations were introduced and will be discussed 
further in the coming sections (Migliore, 2017).  
Figure 2. Historical highlights of the EU medical device regulatory framework. 
 
 
In Canada, succeeding the 1874 Adulteration Act, the current Food and Drugs Act was first 
introduced in 1920 with amendments made in 1949, 1951, and 1985 (Figure 3) (“Canada's new 
food and drugs act”, 1953; Mishra, 2017). It is not clear how these amendments affected the 
regulatory oversight of medical devices but, generally, the amendments organized the legislation 
in an orderly fashion; allowing for food, cosmetics, drugs and devices to be handled individually 
(“Canada's new food and drugs act”, 1953, Mishra, 2017). Along with the Food and Drugs Act, the 
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Medical Device Regulations were first introduced in 1975 and updated in 1998, expanding pre- 
and post-market aspects of the Canadian regulatory framework (Boyer, 2015).  
Prior to the 1998 amendments, only a small fraction (five per cent) of medical devices were 
required to undergo pre-market review; the requirements for which remained static and lacked 
the foresight and adaptability needed to regulate new technology and devices introduced over 
time (Boyer, 2015). This meant that the large majority of devices (95 per cent) were introduced 
to the Canadian market without pre-market review. Health Canada required post-market 
notification within 10 days of the first sale for all new devices (Boyer, 2015). The results of this 
(lack of) regulatory system was that Health Canada did not have an accurate view of the devices 
being sold in Canada (Boyer, 2015). It should be noted that requirements for Good 
Manufacturing Practices and Quality Management Systems were also not put in place (Boyer, 
2015). Thus, the 1998 amendments were needed to ensure that Health Canada had improved 
(both pre- and post-market) regulatory oversight over the sale of medical devices in Canada, their 
advertising, and sale to Canadians (Boyer, 2015). The 1998 amendment also introduced Good 
Manufacturing Practices and Quality Management System requirements along with licensing 
requirements for manufactures (Boyer, 2015).  
Figure 3. Historical highlights of the Canadian medical device regulatory framework. 
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The Medical Device Market 
Globally in 2016, the top segments of the global medical device market were diagnostic 
imaging (e.g. MRI and CT) and consumables (e.g. syringes, needles, sutures, adhesives, etc.) which 
made up 25 per cent and 16 per cent respectively (Government of Canada, 2017). These were 
followed by orthopaedic products and patient aids (e.g. hearing aids and pacemakers) (12 per 
cent each), dental products (seven per cent) and other medical equipment (27 per cent) 
(Government of Canada, 2017). It is expected that the medical device market will grow globally 
with rapid growth expected in the Asian market compared to the Americas and Western Europe 
(Government of Canada, 2017). As mentioned previously, a contributing factor to explain the 
growth in the coming years will be due to aging populations in addition to new forms and uses of 
technology, software and data (Government of Canada, 2017). 
In Canada, the market share was estimated to be around two per cent of the global market 
($6.7 billion USD) in 2016 (Government of Canada, 2017). The top segments of the Canadian 
medical device market (as a percentage of the total sales in 2016) were diagnostic imaging, 
consumables, and patient aids which accounted for 21 per cent, 18 per cent, and 15 per cent 
respectively (Government of Canada, 2017). These were followed by orthopaedic and prosthetic 
products (12 per cent), dental products (eight per cent) and other medical devices (27 per cent) 
(Government of Canada, 2017). 
Global Landscape of Medical Device Regulations 
Before considering the Canadian regulatory framework, it is important to understand the 
players and differing levels of influence on the global landscape of medical device regulations. 
Globally, the US and EU make up the majority of the medical device market share with 51 and 30 
per cent respectively (Altenstetter, 2012). The implications of this is that the EU and US have a 
great deal of influence over the global landscape of medical device development and regulation. 
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The power that these jurisdictions have can be observed in the literature, where a majority of 
papers focus on the EU and US contexts. In the reform of the Canadian regulations a key 
consideration is alignment between the Canadian regulations and US and EU regulatory agencies.  
Furthermore, it is also important to consider the other players that comprise the medical-
industrial complex (Altenstetter, 2012). While one group is the regulatory authority (e.g. Health 
Canada, the US Food and Drug Administration, etc.) the other group comprises the medical-
technology industry and medical device companies (Altenstetter, 2012). Their influence is 
reinforced by trade associations (Altenstetter, 2012). The third group is made up of scientific and 
industry experts. Each group of the medical-industrial complex plays a role in navigating and 
resolving issues within regulatory frameworks at national, regional and international levels 
(Altenstetter, 2012).  
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Jurisdictional Comparison of Medical Device Regulatory 
Frameworks The US & EU Contexts 
The US Context 
In the US, medical devices are regulated by the Center for Devices and Radiological Health of 
the FDA through the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act which covers everything from pre-
market approval to post-market surveillance (Table 1) (Maak & Wylie, 2016; Chen et al., 2018). 
Additionally, with a risk-based classification system, medical devices are categorized into three 
classes (I, II, and III) with class III being the highest risk category (Chen et al., 2018). In order to 
meet the requirements of the Quality System Regulations, manufacturers are required to follow 
Good Manufacturing Practices (Chen et al., 2018).  
Table 1. Comparison of Medical Device Regulations for Canada, EU and the US  
  European Union United States Canada 
Competent 
Authority 
 
Pre-market: Notified bodies 
Post-market: National 
competent authorities 
Food and Drugs 
Administration (FDA) 
Health Canada 
(HC) 
Classification 
System 
 Risk-based Risk-based Risk-based 
Classification  Class I, IIa, IIb & III Class I, II & III 
Class I, II, III & 
IV 
Pre-market 
Review 
Application 
Self-declaration: some Class 
I 
Technical construction file 
& Quality Management 
System: Class Is, Im, IIa, IIb 
& III 
510(k) – most Class II 
devices 
PMA: most Class III 
devices 
Medical device 
license 
required for 
Classes II - IV 
(Application) 
User Fees 
Yes Yes Yes 
License 
validity 
5 years 
1 year (Establishment 
Registration) 
1 year 
Post-market 
Surveillance 
(Manufacturer) 
Report of a 
serious public 
health threat 
Within 2 days Within 5 days 
Not a 
requirement 
Report of 
deaths, 
serious 
injuries 
Within 10 days Within 30 days Within 10 days 
Other Within 30 days Within 30 days Within 30 days 
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In the US from the pre-market side, the most common submissions fall under the Premarket 
Notification 501(k) (referred to simply as 501(k)) and Premarket Approval (PMA) (Chen et al., 
2018). In order to qualify for the 501(k) pathway, devices have to be substantially equivalent to 
devices currently on the market (referred to as a predicate device in the literature) (Maak & 
Wylie, 2016; Chen et al., 2018). Devices that use the 501(k) pathway could have modifications or 
changes in the material, chemical composition, design, energy source, manufacturing process or 
intended use (FDA, 2018). On the other hand, a PMA review requires manufacturers to 
demonstrate safety and effectiveness, compared against a control, through technical documents, 
preclinical laboratory studies, and clinical investigations (Maak & Wylie, 2016; Chen et al., 2018). 
This makes the PMA route is the strictest path for devices to gain approval and is required for all 
class III devices. The distinction between 501(k) and PMA leads to a small but important 
distinction: a difference between devices that are cleared vs approved; while devices that utilize 
the 501(k) route are cleared, they are not approved (FDA, 2018). It is also important to note that 
the pre-market review requires manufacturers to pay the FDA to review their application. 
Referred to as “user fees”, they vary depending on the type of application (e.g. 510(k) and PMA 
have different costs associated with them) (FDA, 2019).  
From the post-market perspective there are many ways through which devices are 
monitored. The FDA uses tracking systems, annual Establishment Registration (of where devices 
are manufactured or distributed for manufacturers), mandatory reporting of device malfunctions, 
serious injuries and deaths for manufacturers along with voluntary reporting of adverse events 
from patients and healthcare facilities in order to ensure that the devices on the market are safe 
for the public (Chen et al., 2018; FDA, 2018). In addition, post-market surveillance studies are 
required for life-sustaining/supporting devices, implanted devices, devices used for pediatrics, or 
devices that would cause serious adverse events if they failed or malfunctioned which were 
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granted approval through the PMA route (Chen et al., 2018). Additionally, manufacturers have to 
notify the FDA of reports of serious public health threats within five days, reports of deaths or 
serious injuries and others (device malfunctions) within 30 days (Table 1) (Chen et al., 2018; 
21CFR803, 2018).  
The EU Context 
Rather than a central agency being in charge of overseeing medical device regulations, the 
EU uses a decentralized system of notified bodies and national competent authorities (Table 1) 
(Maak & Wylie, 2016; Chen et al., 2018). Notified bodies are private, for-profit, companies that 
are certified by the EU which oversee pre-market approval while the national competent 
authorities (which are government agencies in each Member State) oversee post-market 
surveillance (Maak & Wylie, 2016; Chen et al., 2018). It should be noted that the competent 
authorities (of each European Member State) appoint the notified bodies to ensure that 
procedures are completed in accordance with the Directives (Active Implantable Medical Device 
Directive, Medical Device Directive, and In Vitro Diagnostic Medical Device Directive) (French-
Mowat & Burnett, 2012). In regulating devices, the notified bodies use contracts with device 
manufacturers (Maak & Wylie, 2016). Similar to the FDA, the EU uses a rule and risk-based 
classification system with four graduated categories (I, IIa, IIb and III). Devices are placed into one 
of the categories using the classification rules, with class III devices falling into the highest 
classification requiring a greater level of assessment and being the highest risk devices (MEDDEV 
2.4/1 Rev.9 June 2010; French-Mowat & Burnett, 2012; Maak & Wylie, 2016). In addition, similar 
to the FDA, class I devices are granted approval based on manufacturer’s attesting compliance 
with Good Manufacturing Practices, proper labelling, packaging and storage requirements (Maak 
& Wylie, 2016). Notified bodies require data from a literature review and preclinical data showing 
that the device performs according to intended function (Maak & Wylie, 2016). Applications for 
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class III devices require preclinical and clinical evidence demonstrating the devices safety and 
effectiveness (Maak & Wylie, 2016). Similar to the FDA and Health Canada, user fees are utilized 
by the EU in order to gain approval (EMERGO, 2019). In contrast to the FDA, it is important to 
note that the specific notified body that is contracted by the device manufacturer determines the 
requirements needed for approval (Maak & Wylie, 2016). With regard to post-market 
surveillance, the competent authorities in each EU Member State are responsible (Maak & Wylie, 
2016). The implications of this system are that pre-market approvals are not reviewed by 
regulatory agencies while post-market surveillance is under the purview of the regulatory 
agencies. 
As of 2011, adverse events are recorded in Eudamed, a database for medical devices 
spanning the EU (Maak & Wylie, 2016). Through Eudamed, information about device 
manufacturers and their certificate history (including approved, revised, withdrawn, and refused), 
along with clinical trials can be found (Maak & Wylie, 2016). Additionally, manufacturers have to 
inform the relevant competent authority of serious public health threats within two days, reports 
of deaths or serious injuries within 10 days, and other reports (complaints, malfunctions) within 
30 days.  
Further updates were made to the EU regulations in 2017 to address some longstanding 
issues such as a lack of transparency, improved post-market surveillance, better coordination 
between EU Member States, improved pre-market review for high-risk devices, use of a device 
identification system, and the introduction of an implant card for patients (EC, 2018). In addition 
to these changes, improvements to the way notified bodies operate were introduced – a pilot 
program of joint assessments (where external Members of the EU and the European Commission 
were involved in the pre-market approval procedure) was reinforced (EC, 2018). Additionally, the 
use of independent experts was introduced in order to support Notified Bodies in making 
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informed decisions (EC, 2018). There are two additional points to note. The first is that the 
Regulations apply to Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey in addition to the 28 
EU Member States (Figure 2). Second, by going form three Directives to two Regulations, the EU 
essentially changed the approach to medical devices regulation from a suggestion to rules that 
need to be followed. 
The Canadian Medical Device Regulatory Framework   
The regulatory authority overseeing regulation of medical devices in Canada is the 
Therapeutic Products Directorate (TPD) of Health Canada (Table 1) (Chen et al., 2018). The Food 
and Drugs Act and Medical Device Regulations are the main legislative pieces overseeing medical 
devices in Canada (Chen et al., 2018). Aligning with the FDA and EU, Canada also uses a risk-based 
classification system with class IV being the highest risk and most invasive (Gagliardi et al, 2015). 
Through pre-market approval, post-market surveillance and quality systems, the safety, quality 
and effectiveness of medical devices are ascertained (Chen et al., 2018). The class, pre- and post-
market requirements can be seen in Figure 4 below.  
Overview of Current Regulatory Framework 
Figure 4. Overview of the Regulatory System (Seely, 2018).  
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Pre-market Requirements  
As demonstrated in Table 1 and Figure 4, the classification system that Health Canada uses 
to categorize medical devices is based on how much risk the device carries which is defined in 
Schedule 1 of the Medical Device Regulations  as how invasive or active the device is (Gagliardi, 
2015; MDR, 2019). While invasive devices are those that are surgically implanted or penetrate 
the human body, active devices are those that require a source of energy (other than energy 
generated by the human body or gravity) to work (Seely, 2018; MDR, 2019). The quality system 
for medical devices consists of a Medical Device License (MDL) for classes II to IV and an 
Establishment License for class I devices (Chen et al., 2018). Although class I devices do not 
require a MDL, facilities that produce medical devices require Establishment licenses and 
manufacturers have to adhere to proper labeling, safety and effectiveness requirements 
(Gagliardi et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2018). Periodic inspections of these facilities (in addition to 
importer and distributor facilities) are carried out by Health Canada to ensure that the 
requirements detailed in the Medical Device Regulations are met (Gagliardi et al., 2015). It is 
important to note that this part of the regulatory system is similar to that of the EU where the 
lowest-risk devices do not undergo pre-market review. It is also important to note that like the 
FDA and EU, Health Canada also utilizes user fees which are varied depending on the type of 
application submitted by the manufacturer or importer (Health Canada, 2018).  
Post-market Monitoring & Surveillance 
From the post-market perspective, distribution records, records of complaints and 
mandatory problem reporting are required of manufacturers (summarized in Figure 4)  (Chen et 
al., 2018). However, manufacturers and importers only have to notify Health Canada of reports of 
deaths or serious injuries and other issues (device failure/deterioration, improper labelling or 
directions for use) within 10 and 30 days respectively (as mentioned in Table 1) (Chen et al., 
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2018; MDR, 2019). This is in contrast to the EU and US where reports of serious public health 
threats are also provided by manufacturers (as mentioned in Table 1) (Chen et al., 2018). 
According to Part 803 of the FDA Code of Federal Regulations Title 21, events that constitute 
serious public health threats are events which require “remedial action to prevent an 
unreasonable risk of substantial harm to the public health” (Sec. 803.53, 21CFR803). Similarly, the 
European Commission defines a serious public health threat as “[a]ny event which results in 
imminent risk of death, serious deterioration in state of health, or serious illness that requires 
prompt remedial action” (MEDDEV 2 12-1 Rev.8 Vigilance).  
Currently, the Canadian Medical Device Regulations require the manufacturer, importer and 
distributor to maintain distribution records in order for efficient recall and withdrawal of devices 
(MDR, 2019). Distribution records are also required to be updated as needed when 
manufacturers receive information from implant registration cards and from health care facilities 
or patients (MDR, 2019). In addition to the distribution records, manufacturers, importers and 
distributors have to maintain records related to problems or complaints reported by 
patients/consumers as well as the actions taken (investigations, responses, studies, etc.) (MDR, 
2019).  
As stated previously, mandatory reporting of problems is currently required from 
manufactures and importers for any issues that arise within or outside of Canada for devices sold 
within Canada (MDR, 2019). According to the Medical Device Regulations (2019), two reports are 
required for issues – a preliminary and final report which need to include details of the patient 
that reported the issue, all actions undertaken by the manufacturer or importer, preliminary 
comments and a detailed explanation of why the incident occurred, and resulting actions 
(increased surveillance, recall, corrective/preventative actions) from investigations undertaken. 
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When it comes to recall of a device, the Medical Device Regulations (2019) currently states that 
the manufacturer and importer need to notify Health Canada of recalls.  
Implant registration consists of registration cards that are completed at the health care 
facility where the device was implanted and given to both the patient and the manufacturer 
(MDR, 2019). These cards are used to both inform the patient of the details of their implant and 
contact information of the manufacturer and the manufacturer of the details about the patient 
so that efficient tracking of the device can occur.  
When it comes to reporting requirements from sources other than industry, the current 
mechanism is voluntary reporting from health care providers, hospitals, and patients. It is 
important to note that while adverse event reports can be access through the Canada Vigilance 
Adverse Reaction Online Database, medical devices are not included (Government of Canada, 
2017). Additionally, when it comes to reporting issues with medical devices, the online form is 
different from the one used for other health products (Government of Canada, 2017). The lack of 
ease in accessing this form probably prevents people from completing it and subsequently 
contributes to under reporting.  
Proposed Future State of Medical Device Regulations  
Before considering the proposed changes that Health Canada is aiming to make to the 
Medical Device Regulations, it is important to consider other pieces of legislation that will 
influence Health Canada’s approach. One such piece is Vanessa’s Law. Named after a Oakville 
MP’s daughter who died from a contraindication of using a prescription drug, Vanessa’s Law (also 
known as the Protecting Canadians from Unsafe Drug Act) amended the Food and Drugs Act in 
order to improve the safety and regulation of therapeutic products (Government of Canada, 2016 
& 2017; Young, 2016; Mazumder, 2017). In addition to medical devices, this Act applies to 
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prescription drugs, over-the-counter medications, vaccines, gene therapies, and cells, tissues and 
organs (Government of Canada, 2016 & 2017).  
Table 2 lists all of the points in the Medical Device Regulations that Health Canada is 
planning on updating in their effort to modernize the regulatory oversight of medical devices. As 
demonstrated in Table 2, the changes that Health Canada is planning implementing focus on 
enhancing the pre-approval process,  strengthening monitoring and follow-up on medical devices 
(to align with Vanessa’s Law), and increasing the transparency of the pre- and post-market 
regulatory process (Health Canada, 2018). The main pre- and post-market changes along with the 
transparency measures that Health Canada is proposing to introduce will be discussed below 
followed by an analysis of the post-market changes through the factors listed above (burdens, 
innovation, health protection) in the following section. 
Table 2. Summarized comparison of current and proposed changes to Canadian Medical Device Regulations. 
(Health Canada 2016 & 2019) 
Stage in Approval Process Current Regulations Proposed Revision 
Pre-market 
Investigational testing conducted 
by manufacturers only 
Increase clinical investigations 
conducted by medical 
professionals 
Flexibility with the type of clinical 
evidence provided to Health 
Canada to demonstrate safety and 
effectiveness  
Review evidence requirements 
with an aim to strengthen 
requirements for higher-risk 
devices 
Two scientific expert advisory 
committees available 
Increase scientific expertise 
Post-market  
Voluntary reporting from health 
care facilities (including hospitals, 
long-term care facilities, and 
private clinics) 
Mandatory reporting from 
hospitals 
Canadian Medical Devices Sentinel 
Network (CMDSN) currently 
includes 17 healthcare 
organizations (hospitals) 
Expanding the CMDSN to 
include facilities other than 
hospitals (e.g. long-term care 
facilities, private clinics) 
Manufacturers or importers notify 
Health Canada of incidents they 
become aware of 
Ability to compel information 
from manufacturers  
Conduct inspections based on risk 
on a repeated process:  
• Domestic manufacturers – 3 
years 
• Importers – 4 years 
• Domestic distributors – 5 years 
Increase inspections and 
enforcements 
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Transparency Throughout the 
Regulatory Process 
Release clinical data information 
through Access to Information 
Request 
Increase public access to clinical 
data 
Publish summaries of decisions 
made for new Class IV devices 
Publish summaries for new 
Class III and IV devices 
Incident reports for individual 
devices can only be accessed 
through Access to Information 
Requests 
Introduce a searchable medical 
device incident (and approvals) 
database 
 
Pre-market Changes 
On the pre-market side, the two main improvements are increasing clinical research 
conducted by physicians (like that done for drug research) and reviewing and potentially revising 
the evidence requirements for higher-risk devices (Health Canada, 2019). The first of these 
proposed updates is important for our discussion. Currently, only manufacturers can apply for 
investigational testing of medical devices is lacking when compared to the investigational testing 
requirements for prescription drug approval by Health Canada (Health Canada, 2019). By allowing 
independent researchers or healthcare professionals to undertake investigation research, this 
would not only align the medical device regulations with those for prescription drugs but could 
also improve results and mitigate against bias. With independent researchers and increased 
sample sizes, a better understanding of how the device works can be gained and potentially 
prevent the entire Canadian population from being test subjects – as we currently are now. 
However, important questions arise from this point and are related to one point – what will the 
role of industry be? First, if independent researchers or healthcare professionals conduct studies 
on devices, how will these studies be funded? Like other industry groups (pharmaceutical drugs, 
natural health products, etc.) the medical device industry has a lot of money behind it (which 
gives them power and influence over actors in the system like Health Canada, Health Authorities, 
and patients). Due to this wealth and power structure, the current method of carrying out studies 
(within hospitals) requires financial support from the device manufacturer (e.g. referred to as 
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sponsor-initiated studies) at no cost to hospitals. Subsequently, an important question that will 
have to be addressed by Health Canada is what will studies look like if they are not financially 
supported by industry (e.g. manufacturers). A second important question is how will the 
independent researchers or healthcare professionals get access to medical devices? As these 
devices are considered the intellectual property of the device manufacturer, it is unlikely they 
would provide a device without a corresponding benefit. This power imbalance will be explored 
further later in this capstone.  
The second change being considered on the pre-market side is also important but is limited 
to devices that carry higher-risk (Health Canada, 2018). It should be noted that it is not clear 
which classes or types of devices “higher-risk medical devices” correspond to. Perhaps the 
evidence requirements will be strengthened for an entire class of devices or just for devices that 
have similar application qualities; those modeled on previously approved versions for instance. 
The following passage is noted in Health Canada’s Action Plan on Medical Devices:  
“Under the current process for reviewing and approving medical devices, 
there is flexibility on the type of clinical evidence that can be provided to 
demonstrate medical device safety and effectiveness. For example, an application 
for a new medical device can be supported by demonstrating similarities in design 
and performance of an earlier version of the same device. Health Canada will 
review its evidence requirements related to higher-risk medical devices with a 
view to strengthening the evidence requirements for devices based on previously 
authorized versions. In conducting this review, Health Canada will also ensure 
alignment with international practices.” 
 
While more clarity is needed for this point – which class or type of device will Health Canada be 
focusing their efforts to strengthen requirements on – it should be noted that there is a need (as 
noted in Canadian media reports and published articles on a number of devices including 
implantable cardioverter-defibrillators and hip implants) for such an improvement in evidence 
requirements (Maisel, 2005; Gould et al., 2006; Halperin et al., 2008; Curfman & Redberg, 2011; 
Kmietowicz, 2012; Hart et al., 2014; Gagliardi et al., 2015).  
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Post-market Changes 
The first major piece proposed by Health Canada is to improve its ability to compel 
information from manufacturers. With the passing of Vanessa’s Law, Health Canada is able to 
leverage more powers over device manufacturers and importers. This change will ensure that the 
regulation of medical devices aligns with that for other therapeutic products covered under 
Vanessa’s Law. Health Canada currently has to wait for manufacturers to conduct 
testing/investigations if there are reports of a device malfunction, but will gain the ability to 
compel testing, assessments and investigations when it gets new information.  
Another change that Health Canada has proposed is to expand mandatory problem 
reporting to include every Canadian hospital in addition to the current reporting requirements for 
manufacturers and importers. Additionally, recognizing that not every patient gets a medical 
device from a hospital setting, Health Canada has stated that they will be working to include 
health care settings other than hospitals within the post-market surveillance system (Health 
Canada, 2019). Some of these settings include: long-term care facilities and private clinics (Health 
Canada, 2019). This is intended to address the under reporting of adverse events, which may 
happen for a couple of reasons. With the current framework, hospitals, physicians and patients 
can voluntarily notify Health Canada of injuries or serious adverse events, but research has 
demonstrated that there are variety of factors that lead to physician under reporting of adverse 
medical device events (Gagliardi et al., 2017; Resnic & Majithia, 2018; Craig et al., 2019). In their 
study, Gagliardi et al. (2017). Of note was the perception that adverse medical device events 
were a regular or routine part of clinical practice and therefore unnecessary (Gagliardi et al., 
2017). Additionally, Gagliardi et al. (2017) found that this perception was reinforced through a 
lack of (regulatory) oversight, (health care) system infrastructure, and industry response to 
adverse medical device events that were reported. Thus, by expanding their sources of 
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information, Health Canada could be in a better position to address these factors by having the 
ability to initiate a review, investigation or enforcement actions, in addition to improved oversight 
over medical device corporations.  
Improving post-market surveillance is essential for a robust regulatory system since sound 
surveillance systems can ensure that appropriate events are captured consistently which leads to 
effective public health action through policy and/or program interventions. This is especially true 
for medical devices where the pre-market approval phase is not adequate enough to prevent 100 
per cent of the risks (Resnic & Majithia, 2017). With devices being used and/or implanted in 
patients, strong surveillance systems are needed to ensure the regulatory system can respond 
quickly and efficiently to emerging threats to public health (Gagliardi et al., 2017). Appropriate 
surveillance can also serve as a useful tool to inform manufacturers and industry, at large, of any 
device issues, failures or malfunctions that need to be fixed in order to prevent future adverse 
medical device events (Gagliardi et al., 2017). Subsequently, the measures that Health Canada is 
proposing to introduce are necessary improvements for stronger post-market surveillance.  
Transparency Measures Throughout the Regulatory System 
Another proposed change is influenced by the transparency measures under Vanessa’s Law. 
These transparency measures will also move the Canadian Medical Device Regulations closer to 
the regulatory framework of the EU which in 2017 enacted transparency measures to improve 
public confidence in their system.  As noted in Table 2, the proposed increase in transparency will 
be impacting both the pre- and post- market phases of the Canadian regulatory framework. With 
better access to medical device clinical data, device approvals and incidents, this might work to 
improve two things: allowing patients and physicians to be better informed of the options 
available to them and adverse event reporting from patients and physicians. The first way in 
which  access to previously withheld medical device information could benefit patients and 
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physicians is clear – with better access to medical device information, patients and physicians will 
be able to make informed choices about the medical device that is right for the patient. This 
improvement in the informed decision-making of patients and their physicians could also lead to 
the second benefit – increased awareness of the risks and harms that the patient could 
experience. With a better awareness of the risks that could be encountered with the device, 
patients will be in a better position to recognize potential side effects and alert their physicians 
quicker while physicians will be better supported (through improved reporting mechanisms) to 
notify Health Canada of adverse medical events.  
However, the benefits of the proposed transparency measures are contingent on genuine 
transparency on the part of Health Canada. Recently, the Health Canada Clinical Information 
Portal went live (Government of Canada, 2019). Through the portal, information on drugs and 
devices can be reviewed; for which one device application is currently posted (Government of 
Canada, 2019). It should be noted that while new applications for drugs and devices will be 
disclosed on the portal by Health Canada, information on drugs and devices currently available on 
the market still needs to be requested by the public (including health care providers) which will 
then be placed on the portal (Health Canada, 2019). Critics have already called the new portal “an 
empty website[that] is a good analogy for Health Canada’s approach to transparency” (Adhopia, 
2019). Thus, while this transparency measure will align Canada with the EU, Health Canada has 
more work to do to gain the trust of the public and demonstrate that it’s interests align with 
those of the public.    
 
 
25 
 
Analysis of the Proposed Post-market Changes 
Recalling the purpose of this capstone, the following section will analyse the proposed 
changes to the Canadian Medical Device Regulations on their burden on industry, the health care 
system and patients, promotion of innovation, regulatory oversight and health risk protection. 
The proposed regulatory approach will also be considered using the 3-I Framework.  
Impact of Proposed Changes – Burdens on Industry, the Health Care System 
and Patients   
Table 3 restates the proposed post-market revisions along with anticipated reporting 
burdens on industry, the health system, and patients. It should be noted that as part of the 
consultation process, industry (including trade associations and lobbying groups) will have an 
opportunity to provide input and feedback on the proposed changes to the Regulations. While 
this has the potential for allowing industry greater influence on what the changes will look like, 
this is an opportunity for Health Canada to get industry buy-in. With this in mind, consideration 
for the burden on industry has been included in this capstone. Referring to the first row, it is 
important to note that even by changing a voluntary action into something mandatory, under 
reporting might still be an issue. As briefly discussed above, recognition that there is a fault with 
the device is one such example in addition to factors that promote and reinforce physician under 
reporting of adverse medical device events (Gagliardi et al., 2017). Current examples in the media 
where recognition of an issue with a device include vaginal mesh and metal hip implants. While 
patients may be sounding the alarm on a faulty or failing device, physicians might not be taking 
those reports seriously because they believe that the devices have been licensed based on 
evidence-based research.  
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Table 3. Reporting burden on Industry, the Health Care System and Patients for the Current and Proposed 
Regulations. 
 
Summarized in Table 3, the post-market changes that Health Canada is proposing will impact 
Industry, the health care system and patients differently while working to increase regulatory 
oversight of medical device companies. Consequently, this may also work to improve the health 
care system infrastructure and industry responsiveness to reports of device failures or 
malfunctions. As can be seen from Table 3, with the new responsibilities required from hospitals 
and the expansion of the CMDSN, health care staff and patients will have an increased burden in 
reporting failures and malfunctions to Health Canada. While this is a burden for health care staff 
and health care facility administrators (in terms of setting aside time for reporting adverse events 
to Health Canada), patients and their health care providers might experience more 
empowerment to report issues with devices. By requiring health care facilities to report adverse 
events, physicians might become better aware of the limits and potential risks that patients might 
experience with a device and empowered to report them. Furthermore, this in turn could support 
patients when they are disclosing adverse reactions to their health care providers through a 
better surveillance system that can lead to active measures taken by Health Canada.  
27 
 
However, as demonstrated by the third column in Table 3, patients might see an increased 
burden because the beneficial outcomes mentioned above are dependent on adequate reporting 
systems, mechanisms and resources. A related factor of note is how will physicians (or other 
health care providers) be incentivised to report adverse medical device events? Not only will a 
strong reporting mechanism need to be in place for health care providers to submit reports, but 
in order for them to send reports, they will have to incentivised in some way. Perhaps updating 
the relevant payment structures could be a potential solution to gain health care provider buy-in. 
Further concerns reported by the Canadian Society of Hospital Pharmacists (2016) is ensuring 
hospital staff have the appropriate resources (time, training, resources) to meet the mandatory 
reporting requirements of Health Canada. As they explain, the operational impact of reporting all 
adverse events (for drugs and devices) will result in an additional burden placed on (pharmacists,) 
nurses, and other health care professions who work in hospitals (CSHP, 2016). This increased 
burden will be compounded by the reporting deadlines that Health Canada sets. The results of 
this will be that while there is an increased burden on the health system, the reality will be that 
the burden will be experienced by individual health care professionals (CSHP, 2016). This increase 
in workload could result in negative patient outcomes as quality of care is affected (CSHP, 2016). 
Another concern raised by the Canadian Society of Hospital Pharmacists is that when it comes to 
reporting adverse events for medical devices, more professional groups might be involved 
(compared to adverse event reporting for drugs) including materials management, biomedical 
engineering, and physicians (2016). The group also noted that while drug use is overseen in the 
hospital setting (the hospital pharmacy and relevant committees), there typically is no equivalent 
oversight for medical devices (CSHP, 2016). With these and other concerns (ability to mine data 
from different electronic health records used within and across provinces, limits of existing 
information management systems, privacy and confidentiality requirements, etc.) need to be 
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adequately addressed, the results could leave patients in the current situation – having to bear 
the costs of an inadequate regulatory system, research and advocate for their health without a 
lot of support from their health care providers and the larger health system (CSHP, 2016).   
Impact of the Proposed Changes – Promotion of Innovation vs Regulatory 
Oversight and Health Risk Protection  
Another dimension that needs to be considered with the current and proposed changes to 
the Medical Device Regulations is how Health Canada will be striking a balance between 
innovation and health risk protection or regulatory oversight (Table 4). While this balance is hard, 
if not impossible, for regulatory frameworks to find, Health Canada’s proposed changes, 
generally, will work to increase health risk protection and regulatory oversight for patients. 
Finding a balance between innovation and health risk protection or regulatory oversight is 
challenging in medicine because of where the innovations are used. The human body poses a 
challenging and complex environment within which mitigating device malfunctions or failures is 
not straightforward (Consoli et al., 2016). This complexity is compounded by various levels of 
uncertainty that lie at the biochemical level of disease (i.e. knowing exactly what is happening at 
the biomechanical level in the body) all the way to the uncertainty in the devices and software 
that is assumed to bring about a desirable outcome (Curfman & Redberg, 2011; Consoli et al., 
2016). In the face of numerous uncertainties and risks, it is important to note that no regulatory 
system can prevent all risk posed by medical device innovation because of the impracticality of 
studying every device change thoroughly (501(k) route) before it can enter the market (Resnic & 
Normand, 2012). However, the role of regulatory agencies (like Health Canada) is to find such a 
balance between promoting innovation, providing strict regulatory oversight and prioritizing 
health protection.  
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Table 4. Promotion of Innovation vs Regulatory Oversight and Health Risk Protection of Current and Proposed 
Post-Market Regulations. 
 
 
In their attempt to find more balance between innovation and health risk protection, Health 
Canada is trying to address their (previous) lack of regulatory oversight and is consequently 
shifting towards increasing health protection measures. This would not only align the approach 
for medical device regulations with that taken for drugs and other therapeutic products (through 
Vanessa’s Law), but also move towards the regulatory approaches of the US and EU. However, 
there have been published critiques arguing that each jurisdiction’s approach (e.g. the regulatory 
agency) is not adequately responsive (Curfman & Redberg, 2011; Feder, 2012). As discussed 
above, two of the post-market surveillance changes that Health Canada is proposing involve the 
use of mandatory reporting from hospitals and the expansion of the CMDSN which may address 
the underreporting of adverse medical device events. In addition to these changes, Health 
Canada is also leveraging new abilities gained through Vanessa’s Law. Particularly, it has gained 
new regulatory oversight capabilities over industry – such as the ability to compel information 
form manufacturers and recalling unsafe therapeutic products (Government of Canada, 2016 & 
2017). Lastly, the final post-market surveillance measure that Health Canada is proposing is the 
increase of inspections and enforcement actions – again through leveraging the new capabilities 
30 
 
gained through Vanessa’s Law as well as increasing the number of inspectors and analysts in the 
workforce (Health Canada, 2019). Overall, by increasing the regulatory system infrastructure and 
supporting it with input from government and regional sources (hospitals and the CMDSN), 
Health Canada is working to address the issue of underreporting from health care providers and 
facilities. Consequently, the public, health care providers and Health Canada will ideally gain more 
information and subsequently a better picture of how medical devices are working.  
Understanding the Shift in Regulatory Approach - Application of the 3-I 
Framework 
Overview of the 3-I Framework 
The 3-I Framework is useful in understanding policy developments, choices and approaches. 
In using 3-I, ideas, interests and institutions are analysed to understand why and how policies 
change (Gauvin, 2014; Searer et al., 2016). In considering the roles that interests, ideas and 
institutions play in shaping policy approaches, power structures, values/culture, 
knowledge/evidence, policy networks and legacies can be identified and explored. Here I use it to 
consider the roles and influence different actors (industry, government, health care providers and 
the public) and the approach that Health Canada is taking in updating its regulatory approach 
when it comes to medical devices. The following sections will explore the relevant interests, ideas 
and institutions that should be considered for the proposed changes to the Canadian Medical 
Device Regulations.   
Interests 
Table 4 highlights the beneficial aspects of the proposed changes to the Medical Device 
Regulations. By increasing the protection of Canadian health, patients across the country will 
benefit from improved regulations. However, there are some important factors to explore in 
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order to gain a more complete picture of the competing interests that will impact the changes to 
the Regulations.  
 Demonstrated by Tables 3 and 4, Canadian patients and health care providers will be the group 
that benefits the most from the proposed changes to the Medical Device Regulations. With the 
Government’s move to increase transparency throughout the regulatory process the public and 
health care providers will ideally be better informed and aware of the options, risks, and incidents 
reported to Health Canada. This will place health care providers and patients in a better position 
to make informed decisions on the type of device that is most suitable for a patient with a better 
understanding of the risks and clinical settings within which it was tested. However, as stated 
previously this is dependent on a genuine effort on Health Canada’s part to provide the public 
with medical device information. Otherwise, this is simply a political gesture that won’t have real 
meaning behind it. I believe that there is a case for this point; as described above, Health Canada 
has set up the Clinical Information Portal where the public will be able to find information on 
newly approved drugs and devices (Government of Canada, 2019). However, in order to get 
information on drugs and devices that are already on the market, the public has to fill out and 
submit an Access to Information request (which may not get approved). If Health Canada wanted 
to genuinely address transparency, why not release information related to all drugs and devices 
on the Canadian market? What good will information on newly approved drugs and devices do if 
they aren’t being used yet by the public?  
Recalling Tables 3 and 4, with regards to the post-market context, the interests of industry 
will be curtailed slightly with Health Canada’s ability to compel information from device 
manufacturers and importers under Vanessa’s Law. This measure will grant Health Canada more 
power and align the regulatory approach for medical devices with that of other therapeutic 
products. Subsequently, this aspect of the proposed policy change may not be influenced by the 
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interests of industry and lobbying groups as the implementation of Vanessa’s Law is hopefully 
being enforced by the Federal Government.  
Some of the proposed policy pieces that may see pushback from the medical-technology 
industry and medical device companies would be in the in pre-market phase as they will loose 
their power and control over the clinical investigations and may have to change the testing and 
clinical investigations done in order to meet potentially new evidence requirements for pre-
market approval. However, as the proposed policy pieces (both pre-market and post-market) are 
in support of the public interest, the Canadian public, health care communities and societies (e.g. 
Physicians and Surgeons associations, Nurses associations’, and patient advocacy groups) will 
mostly likely want to see the proposed changes get approved.  
Another group, not mentioned so far are the Provincial/Territorial governments and 
Provincial/Territorial/Regional Health Authorities. As with the public and health care communities 
and societies, Provincial Governments and Regional Health Authorities would also be in favor of 
the proposed changes as they would work to reduce health care costs associated with adverse 
events, revisions and complications that occur with medical device malfunctions or failures. This 
is dependent on Health Canada making good use of its new abilities.  
When Interests Collide – Considerations of Conflicts of Interest 
However, the realities of how medical devices are used within healthcare settings will have 
to be considered carefully by Health Canada. This is especially true for invasive and implantable 
devices (pelvic floor mesh, orthopaedic implants, pacemakers, etc.). The decisions that go into 
approving devices (by Health Canada), funding the devices (by health care funding bodies) and 
incorporating the devices into practice (by health and hospital authorities as well as health care 
providers) are supported and/or limited by numerous factors (e.g. amount of evidence, quality of 
evidence, costs of device, comparability to other devices being used, health outcomes, risks, etc.). 
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On top of these considerations are external factors that create tensions within the regulatory 
system. These tensions include: user fees, sponsor-initiated studies, relationships between 
industry and health care providers. While this is not an exhaustive list, these points of tensions 
(present either independently or in combination) can create conflicts of interests for actors 
within the regulatory framework (e.g. Health Canada, health authorities, hospitals, and health 
care providers).  
In order to ensure that costs of Federal Government programs and activities have financial 
capacity, the Treasury Board within the Government of Canada instituted a cost recovery policy in 
1997 (Alpert, 2008). This means that departments across the Federal Government can attach fees 
to regulatory activities (Alpert, 2008). Health Canada is one such department that utilizes user 
fees for its cost recovery process (Table 1) (Alpert, 2008). For medical devices, user fees are 
attached to the pre-approval process (reviewing new applications) and amendments to licensed 
devices which provide a steady source of revenue of the department (Alpert, 2008). The 
implications of relying on this source of revenue is that a conflict of interest is evident here – 
Health Canada which is supposed to act as an independent regulator is taking money from 
industry members who they are meant to be regulating (Alpert, 2008). This issue is further 
complicated with the fact that user fees are tied to service standards for staff within Health 
Canada. If services standards are not met (e.g. the target number of days within which an 
application has to be reviewed and processed elapses) then the user (device manufacturer, 
importer) gets a corresponding discount on their future fees (Alpert, 2008). This system of 
penalties for the regulator and benefits for industry tries to ensure that Health Canada will be 
held accountable to the service standards it sets (Alpert, 2008). This raises concerns across 
jurisdictions that utilize user fees (including the US and EU) of are regulatory agencies actually 
prioritizing the interests of industry? What about the public that bears the consequences if a 
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device malfunctions or fails? Are the service standards realistic to allow staff enough time to 
review and carefully consider the evidence (research studies, quality management, 
manufacturing processes, etc.) before making a decision to approve devices to go on the 
Canadian market? Additionally, as Alpert (2008) points out, there is an inherent bias of relying on 
user fees which pushes regulators towards quantity over quality. The implications of promoting 
quantity over quality relates to medical device innovation. Regardless if the device actually 
provides greater benefit than harm to patients or is more effective than another device, new 
devices will probably introduced to the market thus supporting industry interests that innovation 
is always beneficial for the public.  In updating the Regulations, it is unlikely that Health Canada 
will shift its reliance on user fees but it has to acknowledge the inherent conflict of implementing 
user fees creates when updating, implementing, and enforcing the Regulations.  
Another source of conflict is sponsor-initiated studies of which there is a wealth of 
information on the impacts of pharmaceutical industry financing has on subsequent research 
results (Angell, 2008; Lundh et al., 2012). Generally. It has been well documented within the 
pharmaceutical literature that sponsor-initiated clinical investigations tend to produce results and 
conclusion that favors the drug. In their Cochrane review, Lundh et al. (2012) found that 
sponsored studies of drugs and devices had favorable results and conclusions when compared to 
studies sponsored by other sources. Additionally, the authors concluded that industry bias was 
present which could not be explained by the risk of bias assessment tools developed by the 
authors (Lundh et al., 2012). While this is an important consideration for regulators (who approve 
devices), health and hospital authorities (who purchase devices) and health care providers (who 
use devices) there are concerns which relate back to the proposed pre-market changes Health 
Canada is working to introduce. The proposed pre-market change relevant here is the way clinical 
research might change under the new Regulations. Recalling the discussion above, a couple of 
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the concerns with shifting research into the hands of independent researchers and clinicians 
related to the role industry would have. Specifically, how would this research be conducted 
without industry finance (which is a given for sponsor-initiated trials) and how would the 
independent investigators get access to the devices. The role that industry plays in providing 
financial support and resources (e.g. devices and equipment) to hospitals which undertake the 
research needs to be acknowledged and clearly demarcated for every player within the 
regulatory system. It is especially critical for Health Canada to acknowledge industry interests and 
its influence over medical research.  
The last conflict of interest that will be described here is related to the previous point. The 
potential for conflicting interests when industry develops relationships with health care 
providers. While this has been well documented for the pharmaceutical industry, this is also a 
concern when it comes to the medical device industry. Brennan et al. (2006) point out that while 
industry supports continuing medical education, research and development of new therapeutic 
products, they are still beholden to their stakeholders which gives rise to the conflict between 
health protection and profits. How will patients be able to discern if their health care provider’s 
recommendation is not influenced by industry support? Are there effective ways of avoiding bias 
within health care professions and societies? Alternatively, how can health care providers, 
hospital and health authorities be safe-guarded from industry influence? Thus, understanding the 
influence that industry has in the health care sector (e.g. providing funding, supporting 
educational programs and conferences, providing resources to health authorities and hospitals) is 
critical to regulating it. If regulatory oversight does not take into consideration the full scope of 
industry influence, then how can any regulatory and/or enforcement action have an impact on 
industry?  
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 Ideas 
In opening up the Medical Device Regulations to change, the value/culture and 
knowledge/evidence of Health Canada can be observed. In recognizing the need for change, 
Health Canada is taking steps to ensure that the Medical Device Regulations reflects the 
values/culture of the Federal Government at large. This refers to the values and culture that the 
political party in power brings to the approach the entire Federal Government takes on. One such 
example is transparency. With the previous Conservative party in power, public transparency was 
not prioritized or supported to a large extent. This changed when the Liberal party came into 
power. Transparency and openness is something that every Federal Government branch and 
agency has to incorporate into their standard operating procedures.  This relates to another 
example that Health Canada uses in its policy development process – public consultations. Since 
the mandate of the agency is to protect the health and safety of Canadians, the consultation 
process aims to be inclusive of a diverse range of voices that will provide feedback on the 
direction that Health Canada wants to move toward.  
There are a couple of things that should be noted. First, while health care societies, patients 
and patient advocacy groups, Provinces/Territories and Provincial/Territorial/Regional Health 
Authorities will ideally be engaged during the consultation process, industry will as well. A 
relevant concern here is how much influence (though corresponding levels of engagement) will 
industry have with the policy development process. Additionally, will the level of engagement be 
comparable to that of the other relevant actors (patients, health authorities, etc.)? Second, it 
should be noted that the approach that Health Canada is taking and the pace with which the 
Medical Device Regulations will be updated is influenced by the party in power. Thus, currently, 
the values and approach Health Canada is taking reflect the Liberal Party. Subsequently, the 
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timeline for the milestones listed in the Action Plan are influenced by the impending election and 
potential change in power (Health Canada, 2019). 
In recognizing that the Medical Device Regulations need improvement to ensure the safety 
of Canadians, Health Canada is working to uphold its mandate as a regulator and improve its 
oversight of the medical device industry by leveraging related laws that can help expand its 
powers and abilities. Additionally, as an agency that uses evidence-based decision making, Health 
Canada will hopefully prioritize scientific research when it comes to the development of the 
regulatory pieces that will comprise the updated Medical Device Regulations. This comprises 
another idea – the value of evidence and the role of evidence-based decision making when it 
comes to shaping policy approaches. By leveraging scientific expertise both within and outside of 
Health Canada, policy advisors work to stay informed of research developments from around the 
world (Health Canada, 2016). Policy approaches are also reviewed by policy advisors in order to 
consider other approaches used by different jurisdictions. Thus, evidence (in the form of scientific 
research or policies from other jurisdictions) forms the foundation of policy development and 
supports the approaches proposed to the public during the consultation process. It is important 
to recognize that the approach could then be altered and/or further developed based on 
feedback received from stakeholders. Some stakeholders and stakeholder groups will reflect the 
values of not only the Federal Government, but that of the public to a large extent. Competing 
interests between industry, health care providers, health care societies and associations, 
hospitals, Provincial/Territorial/Regional health authorities and the public will ideally be given 
equal opportunity to find increased levels of industry regulation and health protection.  
Institutions 
As touched on briefly, the historic development of the Medical Device Regulations was 
(generally) always contained within that for drugs. However, the corresponding approach for 
38 
 
medical devices has lagged behind. Consequently, this is a valuable opportunity for Health 
Canada to increase the alignment between the regulatory approach used for drugs, medical 
devices, and other therapeutic products.  
Another institution that is relevant here and the Federal-Provincial responsibilities for 
regulation-delivery of services. While the Federal government shares a role with 
Provincial/Territories in delivering health care and social services for some groups within Canada, 
the Provinces and Territories have the larger responsibility of health and social service delivery 
within their jurisdictions (Health Canada, 2018). The Federal government is also responsible for 
protecting the health and safety of Canadians, disease surveillance and prevention in addition to 
regulating various Industry groups (e.g. food, environment, agriculture, natural health products, 
drugs, medical devices, etc.) (Health Canada, 2018). The implications of this is that while Health 
Canada will set the regulations for how medical devices are governed, the two levels of 
government will have to work together to ensure that  Provinces and Territories are able to meet 
the requirements of the updated regulatory approach. This is where the consultation process 
with policy networks will be essential in ensuring that the responsibilities of the Federal, 
Provincial and Territorial governments are clear and work cohesively. Policy networks comprising 
patient advocacy groups, health care communities and societies as well as Provincial Health 
Authorities would be in favor of the proposed changes as they align with increased patient safety, 
risk reduction and reduced costs in the long-run (for Provincial Health Authorities).  
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Opinion on Proposed Policy Approach 
Overall, the proposed policy changes that Health Canada is intending to make to the Medical 
Device Regulations should work to improve the regulatory oversight of medical devices from the 
pre- to post-market stage and mitigate health risks posed by medical devices (Table 4). These 
changes will continue to align Canada with the US and EU. However, this consideration of aligning 
with other jurisdictions (especially the US and EU) may hold Health Canada back from being 
progressive in their approach to regulation the medical device industry and safeguard public 
health. Nevertheless, while regulatory oversight is important (especially considering the scope 
and the role of Health Canada’s mandate) it is also important to realize that no regulatory system 
will be able to prevent 100 per cent of the risk that medical device innovation poses. Additionally, 
while the medical device-technology industry and medical device companies will experience 
increased regulatory oversight (particularity from the post-market perspective), the proposed 
measures have already been taken up by other jurisdictions (to a greater or lesser extent) such as 
the EU and US. Consequently, while the shift in Health Canada’s regulatory approach might seem 
progressive, the reality of implementing the proposed measures might still fall short which is 
especially true for the proposed post-market and transparency measures. This is something 
critics have noted has occurred with the FDA (Feder, 2012). That being said, the proposed 
measures are a step in the right direction and are needed for improved health protection and 
informed decision making of health care providers and patients across Canada. 
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Reflection 
Reflecting on this issue, I believe it is a threat to public health as well as a social inequity 
issue. While there are other issues at play (reliance on technology and innovation, different types 
of power in technology, access to medical device innovation) the main issues are the structural 
power imbalance between industry and the public. As Health Canada is supposed to act as an 
independent regulator, holding industry in check – we have seen how they are not independent 
from industry groups, and rely on financial support from Industry to carry out everyday regulatory 
activities. Not only is there a power imbalance within industry, the regulator, and the public, the 
influence industry groups have in health authority and hospital settings and with health care 
providers is important to recognize. Thus, the power imbalance is systemic, bleeding through 
many aspects of the health care system that is supposed to prioritize patients and the Canadian 
public first. Subsequently, a symptom of this power imbalance is that the Canadian public has 
become the experimental population. Instead of devices having adequate evidence of their safety 
and efficacy before they reach patients, they do not leading to the real possibilities of injuries, 
failures and malfunctions in the Canadian public. Not only does this impose extra costs on the 
health care system, toll on the individual and their family, the trust that the public has in what 
should be a system that helps (and not harms them) is damaged. This is what we are observing 
now – a regulator that is trying to demonstrate how it ‘cares’ and is in fact ‘prioritizing’ the 
Canadian public all the while continuing to rely on industry to run its activities. Thus, this 
capstone has allowed me not only to further the development of a critical perspective on a public 
health issue but explore power structures that are taken for granted and create social inequities 
present at the National level. This capstone has also allowed to me gain a new skill – conducting 
and writing a policy analysis which I hope to be utilizing after graduation, as a public health 
practitioner. 
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